Key points
- Under the New York State Human Rights Law it is an affirmative defense that the harassing conduct does not rise above what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.[1]
- Under the New York City Human Rights Law the defense comes from case law, and the employer has the burden of proving the conduct's triviality.[2]
- The defense is the floor that replaced the "severe or pervasive" requirement; the City court that created it said it narrowly targets truly insubstantial cases.[3]
- Courts weigh the claim and the defense on the totality of the circumstances, and under City law even a single comment may be actionable in the proper context.[4][5]
- Under federal Title VII the threshold sits on the employee's side instead: the employee has to plead and show conduct that is objectively severe or pervasive.[6][7]
The "petty slights or trivial inconveniences" defense is the lower limit of a harassment claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Both laws treat it as an affirmative defense: the State statute uses those words, and under the City law the employer has the burden of proving that the conduct was trivial.[1][2] It is the floor that remains now that neither law makes "severe or pervasive" conduct a condition of liability; the court that first recognized it said it narrowly targets truly insubstantial cases.[1][8][3]
What the State statute says
The NYSHRL puts the defense in the same paragraph that defines unlawful harassment, N.Y. Executive Law § 296(1)(h):[1]
"It shall be an affirmative defense to liability under this subdivision that the harassing conduct does not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences."[1]
That paragraph took effect on October 11, 2019, and applies to claims that accrued on or after that date.[9] State claims that accrued earlier are governed by the former severe or pervasive test.[10] See where "severe or pervasive" still applies. New York State's model sexual harassment prevention policy describes the result for employees this way: harassment "can be any harassing behavior that rises above petty slights or trivial inconveniences."[11]
Where the City version comes from
Under the NYCHRL the defense comes from case law. It was recognized by the Appellate Division, First Department, in Williams v. New York City Housing Authority (2009), the decision that rejected "severe or pervasive" for City-law claims.[8][2] The standard that decision put in its place is explained in New York City's "treated less well" standard. The court recognized that the broader purposes of the City law "do not connote an intention that the law operate as a 'general civility code,'" and chose an affirmative defense as the way to deal with that concern: defendants can still avoid liability if they prove that the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider "petty slights and trivial inconveniences."[12][2]
The Appellate Division, Second Department, adopted the same standard in 2011, and the federal Second Circuit applies it to NYCHRL claims heard in federal court.[13][2] In 2016 the City Council named the majority opinion in Williams in N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-130(c) as one of the decisions that correctly understood how the City law is to be construed.[14]
Who has to prove what
The order of proof matters, because the defense is often described backwards.
| Step | New York State (NYSHRL) | New York City (NYCHRL) |
|---|---|---|
| What the employee shows | Harassment that subjected the employee to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of membership in a protected category[1] | By a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee was treated less well than other employees because of a protected characteristic[15] |
| What the employee does not have to show | That the harassment was severe or pervasive, or that another individual was treated better[1] | That the conduct was severe or pervasive, or that it involved a tangible action such as hiring or firing[8][16] |
| The affirmative defense | That the conduct does not rise above what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences[1] | That the conduct was nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial inconveniences[2] |
Under the NYCHRL, then, it is not the employee's job to prove that the conduct was serious: the Second Circuit has said that "the employer has the burden of proving the conduct's triviality."[2] The State statute calls its version "an affirmative defense to liability"; the burden wording quoted here comes from City-law decisions, not from the State statute.[1][2]
The defense is also separate from the question of motive. Under the NYCHRL a defendant is not liable if the plaintiff fails to show the conduct was caused at least in part by a discriminatory motive; that is the plaintiff's burden.[12][17] An argument that a manager was equally harsh to everyone goes to motive, which is a separate question from triviality.[17]
The "reasonable victim" viewpoint
Both New York laws measure triviality from the standpoint of a reasonable victim of discrimination. The State statute adds that this is a victim "with the same protected characteristic or characteristics" as the person bringing the claim.[1][2] Federal law uses different words for its own threshold: the objective severity of harassment is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all the circumstances.[18]
New York State's model sexual harassment prevention policy, written for employers' internal rules, adds that the intent behind the behavior, such as making a joke, does not neutralize a harassment claim, and that the impact of the behavior on a person is what counts.[19] That is policy language published by the State, not a quotation from the statute.
How courts have described the line
The decisions described below are City-law decisions. They describe three zones.
- Conduct that is severe or pervasive. This would satisfy even the federal test.[20]
- The broad middle. Williams said the defense should not give license to "the broad range of conduct that falls between 'severe or pervasive' on the one hand and a 'petty slight or trivial inconvenience' on the other."[3] The same opinion observed that experience had shown a wide spectrum of harassment cases in that middle ground.[21]
- Truly insubstantial cases. These are what the defense is aimed at.[3]
Four decisions show where particular facts fell under the City law (more are collected in examples of a hostile work environment):
| Case | Conduct | Result under the NYCHRL |
|---|---|---|
| Williams v. New York City Housing Authority (1st Dep't 2009) | Within the limitations period, comments made in the plaintiff's presence on one occasion, not directed at her, which she took as partly complimentary to a coworker | Held to be nothing more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences; the harassment claim failed[22] |
| Nelson v. HSBC Bank USA (2d Dep't 2011) | Alleged racial harassment of four African-American bank employees | New trial ordered: the jury could have found the harassment, "while not severe and pervasive, constituted more than petty slights and trivial inconveniences"[13][23] |
| Hernandez v. Kaisman (1st Dep't 2012) | Emails with sexual content and isolated comments about employees' bodies, including touching one employee | Not a "truly insubstantial case"; the City-law claim survived summary judgment[24][25] |
| Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux North America (2d Cir. 2013) | Evidence of pornography shared in the office, rating of female employees' appearances, and two sexual propositions by a supervisor | A jury could find the conduct "neither petty nor trivial"; summary judgment for the employer vacated[26] |
Several points come out of these cases. First, courts consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating both the claim and the defense.[4] In Hernandez the court said the emails viewed independently might not have been enough, but that the overall context in which they were sent could not be ignored.[25] Second, isolated does not mean trivial: even a single comment may be actionable in the proper context.[5] (See can one incident be a hostile work environment?) Third, the plaintiff's own reading of the events can matter; in Williams the court relied on the plaintiff's own experience and interpretation of the comments.[22]
The examples above are City-law examples; this page does not describe how courts have applied the State-law version of the defense in § 296(1)(h). What can be said about State law is what the statute says: the wording of the defense, the "same protected characteristic or characteristics" viewpoint, and the instruction that the NYSHRL be construed liberally regardless of how comparably worded federal laws have been read.[1][27]
Judge or jury?
An employer can ask the court to rule on the defense before trial through a motion for summary judgment (a request for judgment without a trial because no reasonable jury could find for the other side). Under the NYCHRL, summary judgment based on triviality is available only if a reasonable jury could not interpret the alleged conduct as anything more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.[28] Williams said that summary judgment remains available where the conduct "does not represent a 'borderline' situation," and said that borderline situations are generally for a jury.[28][3] See summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.
How the floor compares across the three layers
| Layer | Minimum level of conduct | How that point is assigned |
|---|---|---|
| Federal (Title VII) | Severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment[20] | The employee must plead and show it to establish the claim[6][7] |
| New York State (NYSHRL) | Above petty slights or trivial inconveniences[1] | The statute calls it an affirmative defense to liability[1] |
| New York City (NYCHRL) | Above petty slights and trivial inconveniences[2] | The employer has the burden of proving triviality, as an affirmative defense[2] |
What the defense is not
- It is not a renamed "severe or pervasive" test. Under the NYCHRL, severity and pervasiveness are relevant to the scope of damages, not to liability.[8]
- It is not the Faragher-Ellerth defense. That federal defense turns on the employer's reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment and the employee's unreasonable failure to use the opportunities provided.[29] New York's highest court has held that the Faragher-Ellerth defense does not apply to sexual harassment and retaliation claims under the NYCHRL, and the NYSHRL says that not complaining to the employer "shall not be determinative" of the employer's liability.[30][1]
- It is not a defense to conduct that has nothing to do with a protected characteristic. Such conduct fails at an earlier step under both laws.[1][12] See bullying compared with illegal harassment.
Practical notes
For an employee, the usefulness of this rule is mostly in how events are recorded. Because context decides whether a remark is trivial, notes that capture who said what, who else was present, how often similar things happened and how the conduct affected the work are more useful than a bare list of comments. The guide to documenting workplace harassment covers this.
For a manager or small employer, the practical point is that a complaint should not be set aside on the assumption that the conduct sounds minor. Whether it is minor is judged in context and from the viewpoint described above, and triviality is an affirmative defense under both New York laws, one that under the City law the employer has the burden of proving.[1][2] Other defenses are collected in employer defenses in harassment and discrimination cases, and the standards themselves in what is a hostile work environment under New York law?
Common questions
Who has to prove that conduct was only a petty slight?
Under the New York City Human Rights Law, the employer: the Second Circuit has said that, as with most affirmative defenses, the employer has the burden of proving the conduct's triviality.[2] The New York State statute calls its version "an affirmative defense to liability" and does not add separate wording on the burden in the sentence that creates it.[1] Under both laws the employee still has to show mistreatment linked to a protected characteristic.[1][15]
What is a "reasonable victim of discrimination"?
It is the viewpoint from which the conduct is judged. The State statute asks what "a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics" would consider petty or trivial.[1] New York City case law uses "a reasonable victim of discrimination."[2] Federal law words its test differently, asking how a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would see the conduct.[18]
Can an employer win before trial on this defense?
Yes, in limited circumstances. Under the New York City Human Rights Law a defendant is entitled to summary judgment based on triviality only if a reasonable jury could not interpret the alleged conduct as anything more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.[28] The court that created the defense said that juries are, in general, the appropriate body to decide borderline situations.[3]
Does the defense apply to federal Title VII claims?
It is not part of the federal test. Title VII works the other way around: the employee has to plead facts tending to show that the conduct was objectively severe or pervasive and that they subjectively perceived the environment as hostile or abusive.[6] The federal defense that employers raise in supervisor-harassment cases, known as Faragher-Ellerth, is about the employer's complaint procedures and the employee's use of them, not about how trivial the conduct was.[29]
Is a single remark always a petty slight?
No. Under the New York City Human Rights Law even a single comment may be actionable in the proper context, for example one that objectifies women and signals views about the role of women in the workplace.[5] New York State's model sexual harassment prevention policy likewise says any harassing conduct, even a single incident, can be discrimination.[19] Context decides it.
Sources
- N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h) — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80; Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 111. — static.case.law
- Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 80 (1st Dep't 2009) — static.case.law
- Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 111, 113; Hernandez v. Kaisman, 103 A.D.3d at 115. — static.case.law
- Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80 n.30; Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 113; Hernandez v. Kaisman, 103 A.D.3d 106, 115 (1st Dep't 2012). — static.case.law
- Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) — static.case.law
- 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) n.1; Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 320–21 (2d Cir. 2015) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 76; Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 113. — static.case.law
- L. 2019, ch. 160, §§ 2, 16(b), (d); L. 2019, ch. 161, § 4 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 310 (2004); Golston-Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d 24, 41 & n.3 (2d Dep't 2020) — CourtListener, Free Law Project
- NYS Model Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy (2023 version), p. 3; N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h) — State of New York
- Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110; Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 79. — static.case.law
- Nelson v. HSBC Bank USA, 87 A.D.3d 995, 999-1000 (2d Dep't 2011). — static.case.law
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130(c); Local Law 35 of 2016, § 2. — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 78 (1st Dep't 2009); Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110. — static.case.law
- Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110, 114. — static.case.law
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir. 2013) — static.case.law
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- NYS Model Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy (2023 version), p. 4 — State of New York
- Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 76 (1st Dep't 2009) — static.case.law
- Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 64, 80-81 (1st Dep't 2009) — static.case.law
- Nelson v. HSBC Bank USA, 87 A.D.3d 995, 995-996, 999-1000 (2d Dep't 2011) — static.case.law
- Hernandez v. Kaisman, 103 A.D.3d 106, 114-115 (1st Dep't 2012). — static.case.law
- Hernandez v. Kaisman, 103 A.D.3d 106, 114-115 (1st Dep't 2012) — static.case.law
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2013) — static.case.law
- N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 113-114; Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80. — static.case.law
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Zakrzewska v. New School, 14 N.Y.3d 469, 475, 479, 481 (2010). — static.case.law