Key points
- Under federal law, a hostile work environment charge is timely if at least one act that is part of the same hostile environment falls inside the filing period, and the court may then consider the whole period.[1]
- Under federal law, discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer or refusal to hire each start their own clock and are not saved by later related acts.[2]
- The EEOC's New York District Office states that the federal period for filing a charge in New York is 300 days from the alleged harm.[3]
- The New York State Division of Human Rights' rule treats a practice of a continuing nature as occurring on any date up to and including the date it ceased.[4]
- Under the New York City Human Rights Law, the First Department held that a comment made before the limitations period was not made timely by the continuing violation doctrine because it was not joined to actionable conduct within the period.[5]
Conduct that happened before the filing period can sometimes still be part of a harassment claim. Under federal law, a hostile work environment charge is timely if at least one act contributing to the hostile environment falls inside the filing period, and the court may then consider the entire period of the hostile environment.[1]
The same rule does not rescue a one-time decision such as a firing or a denied promotion: under federal law each of those discrete acts has its own filing clock.[2]
This is usually called the continuing violation doctrine. New York State and New York City sources address continuing conduct too, in different words, and this page sets each layer out separately.
The federal rule: National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan
The U.S. Supreme Court set the federal rule in 2002 in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan. It drew a line between two kinds of claims.[2][1]
Discrete acts: each one has its own clock
Under Title VII, discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer or refusal to hire are each a separate unlawful employment practice. Each one starts a new clock for filing a charge, and a discrete act that is time barred is not actionable even when it is related to acts in a timely charge.[2]
The Court said the statute does not stop an employee from using prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.[2]
Hostile work environment: one act inside the period is enough
The Court explained that hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts because their very nature involves repeated conduct. The unlawful practice cannot be said to occur on any particular day; it occurs over a series of days or perhaps years, and a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.[6]
For that reason, under federal law it does not matter that some of the component acts fall outside the filing period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered for the purposes of determining liability.[1]
The acts have to belong to the same hostile environment
The rule has a built-in limit. The Court gave an example based on a 300-day period: acts on days 1 to 100 and on day 401, with nothing in between. A gap alone does not defeat the claim, because a hostile environment is one unlawful employment practice so long as each act is part of the whole.[7]
But if the act on day 401 had no relation to the earlier acts, or for some other reason, such as certain intervening action by the employer, was no longer part of the same hostile environment claim, then the employee cannot recover for the earlier acts by reference to the later one.[7]
Delay can still be raised against the employee
Under federal law, the charge-filing period works like a statute of limitations and is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. In the other direction, an employer may raise a laches defense if the employee unreasonably delays in filing and the delay harms the employer.[8]
What the federal filing period is in New York
Title VII's base period for filing a charge with the EEOC is 180 days. The statute gives 300 days where the person has first instituted proceedings with a state or local agency that has authority to grant or seek relief, or 30 days after notice that the agency has ended its proceedings, whichever is earlier.[9]
The EEOC's New York District Office states that an individual has 300 days from the date of the alleged harm to file a charge of discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, religion or disability against an employer with 15 or more employees.[3]
The EEOC's own summary for ongoing harassment is that the charge has to be filed within 180 or 300 days of the last incident of harassment, and that the agency will look at all incidents when investigating, even if the earlier ones happened more than 180 or 300 days before.[10]
How to file is covered in how to file an EEOC charge in New York.
New York State law: what the sources say about continuing conduct
The New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) has two separate clocks. A complaint to the Division of Human Rights has to be filed within three years after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice, and a court action has to be commenced within three years under CPLR § 214(2).[11][12]
The three-year Division period applies to claims arising on or after February 15, 2024. For discrimination before that date, the Division says the period was one year from the most recent incident, except workplace sexual harassment, for which it was three years.[13][14]
On continuing conduct, three State sources say the following:
- The Division's rule. Under 9 NYCRR § 465.3(e), if the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice is of a continuing nature, the date of its occurrence is deemed to be any date after its inception, up to and including the date it ceased.[4]
- The Division's public guidance. The Division describes its filing period as running from the most recent incident.[15]
- The State model sexual harassment prevention policy. It tells employees that the three years are counted from the date of the most recent incident of harassment.[16]
Two cautions about the State layer. First, the same Division rule, as published, still says a complaint has to be filed within one year, while the statute says three years.[17][11] Second, this page does not state how State courts apply a continuing violation rule to NYSHRL lawsuits; that is a question for a lawyer. The Division rule above governs complaints filed with the Division.
Old incidents may be judged under an older State standard
Timing affects more than whether a State claim can be filed. The 2019 amendments to the NYSHRL, including the current harassment standard in Executive Law § 296(1)(h), apply only to claims that accrued on or after each provision's effective date; conduct before those dates is governed by the earlier law.[18]
Section 296(1)(h) took effect on October 11, 2019.[19]
See when the severe-or-pervasive standard stopped applying to State claims.
New York City law: Williams v. New York City Housing Authority
The New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) also has two clocks. A complaint to the NYC Commission on Human Rights has to be filed within one year after the alleged discriminatory practice occurred, or within three years for a claim of gender-based harassment. A court action has to be commenced within three years.[20][21][22]
On continuing violations, the decision this page relies on is Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, decided by the Appellate Division, First Department, in 2009. The court said that Morgan established, for federal law purposes, that the doctrine applied only to harassment claims as opposed to discrete acts, that federal law in the Second Circuit did not so limit it when the City law was amended in 1991, and that there was no reason to believe the more restrictive 2002 rule was anticipated then or when the City's Restoration Act passed in 2005.[23] It said the City law's remedial provisions are consistent with a rule that neither penalizes workers who hesitate to bring an action at the first sign of what they suspect could be discriminatory trouble, nor rewards covered entities by insulating them from challenges to unlawful conduct that continues into the limitations period.[5]
Williams also shows the limit. The plaintiff there complained about a comment made before the limitations period. Because that comment was not joined to actionable conduct within the limitations period, the court held the continuing violation doctrine did not make the complaint about it timely.[5]
The NYCHRL's three-year period to sue is tolled from the filing of a complaint with the City Commission or the State Division of Human Rights and while that complaint is pending.[22]
The three layers side by side
| Layer | Filing period | What the sources say about conduct that continues |
|---|---|---|
| Federal (Title VII) | EEOC charge within 300 days in New York.[3] | A hostile environment charge is timely if at least one act that is part of the same practice falls within the period; discrete acts each have their own clock.[2][1] |
| New York State (NYSHRL), Division of Human Rights | Three years, for claims arising on or after February 15, 2024.[11][13] | A practice of a continuing nature is deemed to occur on any date up to and including the date it ceased.[4] |
| New York State (NYSHRL), court | Three years under CPLR § 214(2).[12] | Not stated in this guide; see the note above. |
| New York City (NYCHRL), Commission or court | Commission: one year, or three years for gender-based harassment. Court: three years.[20][21][22] | The First Department does not confine the doctrine to the federal Morgan rule; in Williams a pre-period comment not joined to actionable conduct within the period was untimely.[23][5] |
Because the periods differ, a claim that is late under one law may still be on time under another. The complete table, including public employers, is in New York employment claim deadlines, and the exceptions are in tolling and exceptions after a missed deadline.
Related timing rules
- Resignations. In a federal constructive discharge claim, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the limitations period begins to run when the employee gives notice of resignation, not on the resignation's effective date. The case concerned the 45-day counseling period for federal employees. See constructive discharge in New York.[24][25]
- Race claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hostile work environment claims under § 1981 are governed by a federal four-year limitations period, and filing an EEOC charge does not toll that period.[26][27]
- Arbitration. The Second Circuit applied the continuing violation doctrine to the federal law that lets a person alleging sexual harassment avoid a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. It held that a hostile work environment claim that began before March 3, 2022, the date that law took effect, but continued afterward accrued after that date. See forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims.[28][29]
What does not extend the time
The EEOC says its time limits generally will not be extended while a person uses an internal grievance procedure, a union grievance, arbitration or mediation.[10] New York State's model sexual harassment prevention policy warns that complaining internally does not extend the time to file with the Division of Human Rights or in court.[16]
An early contact with an agency may not count as filing either. Under the Division of Human Rights' intake process, the initial report is not an official complaint; the complaint is officially filed when the signed document is returned.[30]
Practical effect
The points below are practical observations, not additional legal rules.
- For ongoing harassment, the EEOC counts its period from the last incident, and the Division of Human Rights describes its period as running from the most recent incident. A dated list of every incident, oldest to newest, shows whether there is one inside each filing period.[10][15]
- Note for each incident who was involved and what it had in common with the others. The federal rule turns on whether the acts are part of the same hostile environment.
- Treat one-time decisions separately. A demotion, a denied promotion, a transfer or a termination has its own date, and the shortest filing period that applies to it is counted from that date.
For keeping records, see documenting workplace harassment. For the agency processes, see filing with the Division of Human Rights and the NYC Commission on Human Rights complaint process. For what makes conduct a hostile environment in the first place, see what a hostile work environment is in New York.
What people commonly get wrong
- "The continuing violation rule saves everything." Under federal law it protects a hostile environment claim with at least one act inside the period; it does not revive a time-barred discrete act such as a demotion or termination.[2][1]
- "The 300 days apply to my State and City claims." The 300-day period is the federal EEOC period. The State Division period is three years and the City Commission period is one year, or three years for gender-based harassment.[3][11][20][21]
Common questions
The harassment started years ago. Is it too late to do anything?
Not necessarily. Under federal law, a hostile work environment charge will not be time barred so long as all the acts are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls within the filing period. The federal question is whether an act that is part of the same hostile environment falls inside the filing period.[1]
Does the continuing violation rule save an old demotion or firing?
Under federal law, no. The U.S. Supreme Court held that discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges, and that each discrete act starts a new clock. The Court said the earlier acts may still be used as background evidence for a timely claim.[2]
What if there was a long gap between incidents?
Under the federal rule, a gap does not by itself break up the claim so long as each act is part of the whole. But if the later act had no relation to the earlier ones, or was no longer part of the same hostile environment because of something like intervening action by the employer, the earlier acts cannot be recovered for by reference to the later act.[7]
Does the clock start over every time something happens?
For a hostile work environment under federal law, the Second Circuit has said the limitations period runs from the time of the last act in the continuing course of conduct. For discrete acts under federal law, each act has its own clock, measured from that act.[28][2]
I quit because of the harassment. When does the clock start for a resignation?
The U.S. Supreme Court held, in a case about the 45-day federal-employee counseling period, that the limitations period for a constructive discharge claim begins to run when the employee gives notice of resignation, not on the date the resignation takes effect, because the resignation is part of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.[24][25]
Does complaining to HR keep old incidents alive?
Not according to the EEOC or New York State's model policy. The EEOC says its time limits generally will not be extended while a person pursues an internal grievance procedure, and New York State's model sexual harassment prevention policy tells employees that complaining internally does not extend the time to file with the Division of Human Rights or in court.[10][16]
Sources
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 (2002) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113–14 (2002) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- EEOC, New York District Office, "Timeliness" (read 5 Oct 2026) — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- 9 NYCRR § 465.3(e) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 72-73, 80-81. — static.case.law
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 118 (2002) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121–22 (2002) (laches wording from syllabus at 103) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- EEOC, "Time Limits For Filing A Charge" — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(5) — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 307 (1983); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) — CourtListener, Free Law Project
- L. 2023, ch. 656, §§ 1–2 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(5) as amended by L. 2019, ch. 160, § 13; DHR, "Report Discrimination" — New York State Division of Human Rights
- N.Y.S. Division of Human Rights, "Report Discrimination" — "Deadline for Reporting Discrimination" — New York State Division of Human Rights
- NYS Model Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy (2023 version), p. 10 — State of New York
- 9 NYCRR § 465.3(e); N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(5) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- L. 2019, ch. 160, § 16(d), as amended by L. 2019, ch. 161, § 4 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- L. 2019, ch. 160, §§ 2, 16(b), (d); L. 2019, ch. 161, § 4 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-109(e). — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-109(e); Local Law 100 of 2018. — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d). — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 72 (1st Dep't 2009) — static.case.law
- Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016) (No. 14-613, decided May 23, 2016) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016) (No. 14-613, decided May 23, 2016; opinion of the Court, Part III, and syllabus point 2) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a); Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1975) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., No. 23-658-cv, slip op. at 2, 25, 28 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2024) — U.S. Government Publishing Office
- Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., No. 23-658-cv, slip op. at 2-3 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2024) — U.S. Government Publishing Office
- N.Y.S. Division of Human Rights, "Report Discrimination" and "What To Expect" — New York State Division of Human Rights