Key points
- Under Title VII, harassment is actionable only if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.[1]
- The environment must be one a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and the employee must personally perceive it as abusive.[2]
- Courts look at all the circumstances, including frequency, severity, whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with work performance.[3]
- The conduct must be because of a protected characteristic; Title VII is not a general civility code.[4]
- The EEOC voted on January 22, 2026, to rescind its 2024 harassment guidance; Title VII, the EEOC regulation and the court decisions are unchanged.[5][6]
Under federal law, a hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.[7] The environment must be hostile both objectively, to a reasonable person, and subjectively, to the employee.[2] This page explains that test as federal courts in New York apply it. It is the federal test only: New York State and New York City use different standards, described in what is a hostile work environment under New York law?
Where the federal claim comes from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.[8] The words "hostile work environment" are not in the statute; they are a label that courts adopted for one way harassment can violate that ban.[9]
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the claim in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), holding that the language of Title VII is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination.[10] The Court described the principle as a right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult.[11]
What an employee has to show
The Second Circuit, the federal appeals court that covers New York, states the claim in three parts. A plaintiff must plead facts tending to show that the conduct:[12][13]
- is objectively severe or pervasive, meaning it creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive;[13]
- creates an environment that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive; and[13]
- creates that environment because of the plaintiff's sex or other protected characteristic.[13][14]
There also has to be a basis for holding the employer responsible for the conduct, which is a separate question covered below.[15][16]
"Severe or pervasive"
The Supreme Court's phrase is "severe or pervasive."[1] The Second Circuit explains the two routes: as a general rule, incidents must be more than episodic and must be sufficiently continuous and concerted to be deemed pervasive, while isolated acts, unless very serious, do not meet the threshold.[17] In Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993) the Supreme Court called the standard a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring a tangible psychological injury.[7] It also acknowledged that this "is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test."[18]
Objective and subjective
If the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of employment.[2] The objective side is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all the circumstances and the social context in which the behavior occurs.[19] The Second Circuit's working question is whether the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.[20]
The Harris factors: totality of the circumstances
Whether an environment is hostile or abusive "can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances." The Supreme Court listed factors that may be included:[3]
- the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;[3]
- its severity;[3]
- whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and[3]
- whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance.[3]
These are factors, not elements. Psychological harm may be taken into account like any other relevant factor, but no single factor is required.[21] The Second Circuit has held specifically that a plaintiff does not have to show a physical threat or a decline in work performance.[22]
In Harris itself the Supreme Court did not decide whether the conduct amounted to a hostile environment; it sent the case back because the lower court had applied the wrong legal standard.[18] The conduct alleged there is set out in examples of a hostile work environment.
"Because of" a protected characteristic
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace. The employee must always prove that the conduct was discrimination because of a protected characteristic, and the Supreme Court has said the statute is not a "general civility code."[4] Three points from the case law fill this in:
- Same-sex harassment is covered. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998) the Supreme Court held that nothing in Title VII bars a claim merely because the plaintiff and the harasser are of the same sex.[23]
- Sexual desire is not needed. Harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.[24]
- Neutral-looking incidents can count. The Second Circuit has said that incidents that are sex-neutral on their face may sometimes be used to establish a course of sex-based discrimination, for example where the same individual is accused of multiple acts, some overtly sexual and some not.[25]
Harassment on bases other than sex is covered in hostile work environment based on race, religion, age or disability, and treatment with no link to a protected characteristic in bullying compared with illegal harassment.
What is not enough under federal law
The Supreme Court has said that the mere utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive feelings in an employee does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.[26] It has also said that simple teasing, offhand comments and isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment, and that conduct must be extreme to do so.[27]
The Second Circuit has at the same time "repeatedly cautioned against setting the bar too high."[20]
Second Circuit statements on frequency, single incidents and context
| Point | What the Second Circuit has said (federal law) |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Incidents must generally be sufficiently continuous and concerted to be deemed pervasive[17] |
| Single incidents | A single act can meet the threshold if by itself it transforms the plaintiff's workplace; it must be extraordinarily severe but need not involve an actual or threatened physical assault[17][28] |
| Conduct aimed at others | Discriminatory remarks made in the plaintiff's presence, though not directed at the plaintiff, can contribute to a hostile work environment[22] |
| Pornography | The mere presence of pornography in a workplace can alter the status of women there and is relevant to the objective hostility of the environment[29] |
| Method | Courts use a totality of the circumstances approach[28] |
In Banks v. General Motors (2023), the plaintiff's evidence included a racial slur from a manager in front of other employees, Confederate flags on employees' vehicles and clothing, and nooses displayed on three occasions near Black employees' workstations; the Second Circuit vacated summary judgment for the employer, concluding that a reasonable jury could find in her favor.[30] For more on one-time events see can one incident be a hostile work environment?
When the employer answers for it
A hostile environment is one part of a federal claim; the other is a specific basis for imputing the conduct to the employer.[15] An employer is vicariously liable for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with authority over the employee.[16] If the supervisor's harassment did not result in a tangible employment action, the employer can raise the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense by proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to use the preventive or corrective opportunities provided.[16] For this purpose a "supervisor" is someone the employer has empowered to take tangible employment actions against the victim.[31] If the harasser is a coworker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.[32]
Details are in employer liability for harassment by supervisors and coworkers and whether you have to report harassment to HR first.
Coverage and timing
Title VII covers an employer only if it has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.[33] A Title VII charge has to be filed with the EEOC within a fixed period after the alleged unlawful practice, and in New York the EEOC states that an individual has 300 days from the date of the alleged harm to file.[34][35] Because a hostile work environment is made up of repeated conduct, a charge is timely if at least one act contributing to it falls within the filing period, and a court may then consider the entire period of the hostile environment.[36] See how to file an EEOC charge in New York and the continuing violation doctrine.
The status of EEOC guidance
Readers will find many pages that cite the EEOC's 2024 "Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace." It is no longer in force. The sequence was:
- On April 29, 2024, the EEOC issued the guidance, which superseded its earlier harassment guidance documents from 1990, 1994 and 1999.[37]
- On May 15, 2025, a federal district court in Texas vacated portions of it nationwide.[38]
- On January 22, 2026, the Commission voted 2 to 1 to rescind the guidance in full.[5]
As of October 2026 the 2024 guidance is rescinded and the older documents it replaced remain marked "Rescinded."[5][37] Title VII itself, the EEOC's regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 and the Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions are unaffected, and the EEOC's Chair stated that the rescission does not give employers license to engage in unlawful harassment.[6] The EEOC's current public summary still describes harassment as unlawful where enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of continued employment, or where the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile or abusive.[39]
The rescission concerns a federal agency document. It did not change the New York State Human Rights Law or the New York City Human Rights Law, each of which sets its own harassment standard.[6][40][41]
How the federal test differs from New York's two tests
For claims that accrued on or after October 11, 2019, the New York State Human Rights Law makes harassment unlawful regardless of whether it would be considered severe or pervasive.[40][42] Under the New York City Human Rights Law the question is whether the employee was treated less well because of a protected characteristic, and severity and pervasiveness go to damages.[41][43] Where more than one of these laws applies, the same events are measured under each law's own test. See where "severe or pervasive" still applies, New York City's "treated less well" standard and Title VII in New York.
A common misreading of Muldrow
In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) the Supreme Court held that an employee challenging a discriminatory job transfer under Title VII must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment, but need not show that the harm was significant.[44] That decision concerned a transfer. The Supreme Court's hostile work environment test remains the one stated in Meritor and Harris.[1][7]
Common questions
Do I have to show psychological harm to win a federal hostile work environment claim?
No. In Harris v. Forklift Systems the U.S. Supreme Court said Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown, and that while psychological harm may be taken into account like any other relevant factor, no single factor is required.[21] The Second Circuit has also held that a plaintiff need not show a physical threat or that work performance suffered.[22]
Can a single incident meet the federal test?
Sometimes. The Second Circuit's general rule is that isolated acts, unless very serious, do not meet the threshold, but that even a single act can do so if by itself it works a transformation of the plaintiff's workplace.[17] In 2023 the court added that a single incident must be extraordinarily severe but need not involve an actual or threatened physical assault.[28]
Does the federal test cover harassment that is not sexual?
Yes. The EEOC's regulation says its principles continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin, and the Second Circuit applies one hostile work environment standard under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983.[14] The Second Circuit has also held that hostile work environment claims can be brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, using the same severe or pervasive standard.[15]
Can I sue the harasser personally under Title VII?
Not in the Second Circuit, the federal appeals court that covers New York. A supervisor or coworker cannot be held personally liable under Title VII; only the employer can.[12] Individual liability under New York State and New York City law is a separate question, covered in the guide on suing a boss personally.
Is the EEOC's 2024 harassment guidance still in effect?
No. A federal court vacated parts of it on May 15, 2025, and the EEOC voted 2 to 1 on January 22, 2026, to rescind it in full.[38][5] The earlier EEOC harassment documents it had replaced remain marked rescinded.[37] Title VII, the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 and the court decisions described here are unaffected.[6]
Sources
- Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- EEOC, Commission Votes: January 2026; EEOC Press Release, "EEOC Commission Votes to Rescind 2024 Harassment Guidance" (Jan. 23, 2026) — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- EEOC Press Release (Jan. 23, 2026) — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) — static.case.law
- Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) — static.case.law
- 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) n.1; Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 320–21 (2d Cir. 2015) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2019) — static.case.law
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) — static.case.law
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19, 22-23 (1993) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) — static.case.law
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Rasmy v. Marriott International, Inc., 952 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2020) (slip op. at 4) — U.S. Government Publishing Office
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374–75 (2d Cir. 2002) — static.case.law
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Banks v. General Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023) (slip op. at 30–31, 35) — U.S. Government Publishing Office
- Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) — static.case.law
- Banks v. General Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023) (slip op. at 3-4) — U.S. Government Publishing Office
- Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 424, 449 (2013) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- EEOC, New York District Office, "Timeliness" (read 5 Oct 2026) — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 (2002) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (June 18, 1999) (web page status banner); EEOC Press Release, "Federal Court Vacates Portions of EEOC Harassment Guidance" (May 20, 2025) — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- Texas v. EEOC, No. 2:24-CV-173 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2025), as reported in EEOC Press Release (May 20, 2025) — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- EEOC, "Harassment" (read 5 Oct 2026) — U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h) — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 78 (1st Dep't 2009); Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110. — static.case.law
- L. 2019, ch. 160, §§ 2, 16(b), (d); L. 2019, ch. 161, § 4 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 76; Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 113. — static.case.law
- Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) (slip op. at 1 (opinion); syllabus at 2) — Supreme Court of the United States