Key points
- In federal court, summary judgment is granted only if the moving party shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; in the New York State courts the motion is denied if any party shows facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact.[1]
- On a New York City Human Rights Law claim, the Appellate Division, First Department, has held that the employer bears the burden of showing that no jury could find it liable under any evidentiary route: the McDonnell Douglas test, mixed motive, or direct or circumstantial evidence.[2]
- Under federal law in the Second Circuit, close timing alone does not defeat summary judgment on a retaliation claim once the employer has given a legitimate reason, though timing may be combined with other evidence such as inconsistent explanations.[3]
- The New York Court of Appeals held in 2014 that the State and City Human Rights Laws generally preclude summary judgment for an employer that has not shown it engaged in a good-faith interactive process over a requested disability accommodation.[4]
- Summary judgment remains available to employers in City-law cases where the record shows that no reasonable jury could find liability, for example where the conduct could only be seen as petty slights or trivial inconveniences.[5]
Summary judgment is a motion that asks the judge to decide a case, or part of it, without a trial. In federal court it is granted only if the moving party shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; in the New York State courts it is denied if any party shows facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact.[1] Those are general rules of civil procedure. What changes in an employment case is the legal test the judge measures the evidence against, and that test differs between federal law, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).
When is the motion made, and by whom?
Either side may make it, usually after the exchange of evidence.[1] In federal court, a party may move on each claim or defense, or on part of one, and unless a local rule or court order sets a different time the motion may be filed at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.[6] In the New York State courts, any party may move after issue has been joined; if the court sets no cut-off date, the motion must be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown.[7]
The court decisions discussed on this page all arose from motions made by employers. Where the motion sits among the other stages is shown in the stages of an employment lawsuit.
What does the judge look at?
The judge decides on a paper record. In federal court, a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing particular parts of the record, such as depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, admissions and interrogatory answers.[6] In the New York State courts, the motion must be supported by affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions.[7]
How does the federal framework work at summary judgment?
For a federal Title VII discrimination claim that rests on circumstantial evidence, courts use the three-step order of proof from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The employee first shows a prima facie case; the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show that the stated reason is a pretext.[8][9] The ultimate burden of persuading the fact-finder that the employer intentionally discriminated stays with the plaintiff throughout.[9]
Under federal law, a prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence that the employer's asserted justification is false may permit the fact-finder to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated, although the Supreme Court added that this will not always be adequate.[10]
Federal retaliation claims follow the same three steps but a stricter causation rule: a Title VII retaliation claim requires proof that the adverse action would not have occurred without the retaliatory motive.[11][12] In the Second Circuit, an employee may show this through weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies or contradictions in the employer's stated reasons.[13] Under the same federal case law, timing alone is not enough at the pretext stage, but an employee may rely on timing together with other evidence, such as inconsistent employer explanations, to defeat the motion.[3] See proving retaliation.
In Banks v. General Motors (2023), the Second Circuit vacated a summary judgment for the employer, concluding that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff on her hostile work environment, disparate treatment and retaliation claims.[14] The framework itself is explained in how discrimination is proved.
How are New York City claims treated differently?
The NYCHRL covers conduct with the required connection to New York City, and courts must analyze a claim under it separately and independently from any federal or State claim, even where the statutes use comparable language.[15][16] Three features of that analysis bear on summary judgment.
- Every evidentiary route has to be closed. In Bennett v. Health Management Systems, the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the employer bears the burden of showing that, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, no jury could find it liable under any of the evidentiary routes: the McDonnell Douglas test, mixed motive, or direct or circumstantial evidence.[2]
- Partial motive is enough. In Melman v. Montefiore Medical Center, the First Department said a plaintiff should prevail under the NYCHRL by proving that unlawful discrimination was one of the motivating factors, even if not the sole one, and so need not prove that the employer's stated reason was actually false or entirely irrelevant.[17]
- Evidence of pretext. Bennett states that evidence of pretext should in almost every case indicate to the court that a motion for summary judgment must be denied.[2]
The NYCHRL itself names Bennett, with Albunio v. City of New York and the majority opinion in Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, as decisions that correctly understood the law's liberal construction requirement.[18]
For City-law retaliation (see retaliation under the NYCHRL), the Second Circuit said in Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux North America that summary judgment is appropriate only if the plaintiff cannot show that retaliation played any part in the employer's decision.[19] For City-law harassment, the same court said an employer is entitled to summary judgment based on the conduct's triviality only if a reasonable jury could not interpret the alleged comments as anything more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.[5] In Mihalik itself the court vacated summary judgment for the employer and remanded for trial.[20]
Summary judgment still remains available to employers in City-law cases where the record shows as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could find liability under any theory.[5] See the petty slights and trivial inconveniences defense.
Where does New York State law stand?
The procedural test in the New York State courts is the one in the Civil Practice Law and Rules: the motion is denied if any party shows facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact.[1] On the substance, the NYSHRL has said since an amendment signed on August 12, 2019, that it must be construed liberally for its remedial purposes regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including comparably worded ones, have been so construed.[21][22]
This page does not describe how the McDonnell Douglas steps apply to State-law claims on summary judgment after that amendment, and it does not treat the State approach as matching the federal or the City one.
What is different about accommodation claims?
Disability accommodation cases have their own summary judgment rules, which differ by layer.
| Federal (ADA, Second Circuit) | New York State (NYSHRL) | New York City (NYCHRL) |
|---|---|---|
| The plaintiff bears the burdens of production and persuasion as to the existence of some accommodation that would allow performance of the essential functions of the job.[23] | To win summary judgment, the employer must show that it engaged in a good-faith interactive process that assessed the needs of the disabled individual and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested.[4] | The Court of Appeals said the City law forecloses summary judgment where the employer has not engaged in a good-faith interactive process regarding a specifically requested accommodation.[4] |
| An employer's failure to engage in an interactive process does not form the basis of an ADA claim in the absence of evidence that accommodation was possible.[24] | The employee cannot obtain a favorable verdict or summary judgment solely because the employer failed to engage in an interactive process.[25] | Refusing or failing to engage in a cooperative dialogue within a reasonable time with a person who requested an accommodation is itself an unlawful discriminatory practice.[26] |
| Where the employer has already provided or offered an accommodation, it is entitled to summary judgment if, on the undisputed record, that accommodation is plainly reasonable.[27] | At trial on the State claim, the employee still has to prove that a reasonable accommodation existed.[25] | The employer has the burden of proving undue hardship.[28] |
The State-law entries and the first City-law entry come from Jacobsen v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 2014.[4][25] See the interactive process and the cooperative dialogue and reasonable accommodation in New York.
What happens after the ruling?
If the motion is denied, the surviving claims go to trial.[1] If a federal court grants the motion on the federal claims and then dismisses the State and City claims it was hearing under supplemental jurisdiction, the limitations period for those claims is tolled while they were pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless State law provides longer.[29]
No official figure given here measures how many employment cases end at this stage. The official federal table shows only how few civil cases of all types ended during a trial: 77 of the 8,922 terminated in the Southern District of New York in the 12 months ending June 30, 2026.[30]
What people commonly get wrong
- "Summary judgment works the same way under the City law as under federal law." Under the NYCHRL the employer must negate every evidentiary route, including mixed motive.[17][2]
- "Timing by itself gets a retaliation claim to a jury." Under federal law in the Second Circuit, temporal proximity alone is insufficient to defeat summary judgment at the pretext stage.[3]
- "If the employer skipped the interactive process, the employee wins." Under the NYSHRL, the New York Court of Appeals said the lack of a good-faith interactive process forecloses summary judgment for the employer "in all but the most extreme cases," but does not by itself entitle the employee to summary judgment or a verdict.[4][25]
Common questions
What is summary judgment?
It is judgment without a trial. After the parties have exchanged evidence, either side may ask the judge to decide the case, or part of it, on the written record. In federal court the judge grants the motion if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the New York State courts the motion is denied if a party shows facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact.[1][6]
Can an employee move for summary judgment too?
Yes. The rules are written for any party. In the New York State courts, any party may move for summary judgment in any action after issue has been joined.[7] In federal court, a party may move on each claim or defense, or on part of one.[6] There are limits specific to some claims: under New York State law, an employee cannot obtain summary judgment on an accommodation claim solely because the employer failed to engage in an interactive process.[25]
Why are New York City Human Rights Law claims treated differently?
Because the City law must be construed liberally to accomplish its uniquely broad and remedial purposes, regardless of how comparably worded federal or State laws have been construed, and courts must analyze City-law claims separately from federal and State claims.[31][16] Applying that rule, the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the employer must show no jury could find it liable under any evidentiary route.[2]
Is showing that the employer's reason is false enough to get to trial?
The answer depends on the layer. Under federal law, a prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence that the employer's justification is false may permit the fact-finder to conclude the employer discriminated, though the U.S. Supreme Court said such a showing will not always be adequate.[10] Under the City law, the First Department said that some evidence that an employer's reason is false, misleading or incomplete should in almost every case mean the motion is denied.[2]
What happens if summary judgment is denied?
The claims that survive go to trial.[1] In federal court a party seeking compensatory or punitive damages under Title VII or the ADA may demand a jury, and in the New York State courts issues of fact are tried by a jury, unless waived, in an action seeking a judgment for a sum of money only.[32] A denial is not a finding that the employer discriminated; it means a disputed fact has to be tried.
If the federal claims are dismissed on summary judgment, are my State and City claims over?
Not necessarily. When a federal court dismisses State-law claims that it was hearing under supplemental jurisdiction, the limitations period for those claims is tolled while they were pending and for 30 days after the dismissal, unless State law provides a longer tolling period.[29] The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "tolled" here means the clock stops while the claims are pending in federal court.[29]
Sources
- N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a), 3212(a)-(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 56(a) — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Bennett v. Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 41, 45 (1st Dep't 2011); Melman, 98 A.D.3d at 113. — static.case.law
- Zann Kwan v. Andalex Group LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013); El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) — CourtListener, Free Law Project
- Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 827, 837–38 (2014) — static.case.law
- Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 113-114; Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80. — static.case.law
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (b), (c)(1), (d) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3212(a), (b) — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) — Library of Congress, United States Reports
- Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) — CourtListener, Free Law Project
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Zann Kwan v. Andalex Group LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013) — CourtListener, Free Law Project
- Banks v. General Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023) (slip op. at 3-4) — U.S. Government Publishing Office
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1); N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(1), (9); N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-109(a), 8-502(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 66; Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013). — static.case.law
- Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 A.D.3d 107, 127 (1st Dep't 2012); Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 78 n.27. — static.case.law
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130(c); Local Law 35 of 2016, § 2. — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 116 (2d Cir. 2013) — static.case.law
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2013) — static.case.law
- N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- L. 2019, ch. 160, §§ 6, 16 — New York State Senate, Laws of New York
- McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009) — static.case.law
- McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2009) — static.case.law
- Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 838 (2014) — static.case.law
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(28)(a) — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- Noll v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2015) — static.case.law
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102 (definition of "Reasonable accommodation") — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); Artis v. District of Columbia, No. 16-460 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2018) (syllabus) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary (June 30, 2026), Table C-5, "U.S. District Courts–Median Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition" — uscourts.gov
- N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130(a). — New York City Commission on Human Rights
- N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a)-(b) — New York State Senate, Laws of New York